There are people who will tell you that all PR is good PR. In my years in security I have seen both sides of that debate true. Lately though, particularly for security companies who are selling into the enterprise - this may be a double-edged sword that cuts deep.
Look at any reputable (and some not-so-much) security vendor's website and you'll notice there's always a page that gives you all the different logos of the companies who use their products. Most times the vendor pays dearly for that either through deep discounts, or some other concessions just to be able to use the reference. Generally this works to the vendor's advantage because seeing Vendor X used by your peers means that perhaps it's a good idea to give them a look.
Except, maybe, when those peers are getting hammered for being a data breach victim.
This has happened a few times recently with vendors touting big names as marquee clients- then the marquee client suffers a massive data breach. Interestingly enough, some sales people still use the fact that the client had the product running in their environment to push the sales agenda, but I don't think this is the approach they want.
Think about it.
Your big client gets hit while they're being hailed as using your product or service. Are you sure you want to claim victory? Most of these aren't little incidents, but rather the kinds of breaches that make lawyers cry.
There are two ways this presents itself-
First, your product or service supports either the defense, detection, response or recovery from the attack and subsequent breach. This bodes well, generally. If the organization made the investment in your product or service and you helped them decrease the amount of pain they and their customers have to go through - you win.
Second, your product was a bystander - neither helping nor hurting. This is where things get a little sketchy. Maybe you were sold the "SQL Injection Prevent-o-Matic" but your big e-commerce site was thoroughly ransacked using SQL Injection. There are two sub-plots that you can follow...
If your product or service detected or could have prevented, detected, or helped respond/recover from the attack but no one operationalized your product or service - you're in trouble.
Alternatively, if your product or service completely missed the attack and didn't provide value - you're in trouble.
I've watched companies present marquee customers all the time with little regard for what that means to their corporate brand. "This company just got hacked, true, but our product was right there telling them that they were getting hacked! If only they listened to our amazing product!" is perhaps the worst marketing pitch, ever. You know why? Because you're demonstrating that even though your product could do amazing things for your clients, your failure to teach your clients how to operationalize and be effective with your product at best makes the whole thing a bad investment. At very worse, it makes your product or service crap.
This is why I marvel when I hear that claim made - "They bought our stuff, if only they had used it properly...". It makes me crazy because you're taking a backhanded swipe at your client all while making a clear statement that you were part of the failure.
Folks security kit isn't magic. You don't claim victory by having it dropped off at your dock, or even having it in-line and blinking in your racks. Heck you don't even get credit if the console is up on someones screen. Only when it's fully operationalized do you get to claim credit, in a positive way.
Repeat after me - fully operationalized is how we claim success. I can't stress this enough. It's baffling that vendor and enterprise alike aren't fully getting this in wide adoption. Owning a Formula 1 car doesn't make a winning Formula 1 team. A good pit crew, managers, lots of practice, operational mechanics, management, a driver and good telemetry are just the start of it. Once you get all of the parts together you have to work out bugs until the whole thing is near-perfect. Then you push harder. That's how you operationalize security - otherwise you've failed.