Friday, August 8, 2014

Why Your Enterprise Most Likely Doesn't Have a Zero-Day Problem

It should come as no surprise that at Black Hat 2014 this week there were an enormous amount of invaluable conversations, as always. We talked about attacks, exploits and exploitation techniques as well as defenses basic and exotic. A few of these ended up in the same place, logically, and have led me to conclude that the majority of enterprises out there don't have a zero-day problem. Let me explain...

It should by now be clear if you're a security professional that the average enterprise struggles with even the most basic security hygiene. This of course makes life difficult when we start to pile on cross-silo dependancies - for example configuration management - for security effectiveness. While I certainly don't mean to imply that every enterprise can't do the basics, I have yet to meet a CISO who is comfortable with the fundamentals of asset, configuration and user management on an enterprise scale and in a timely fashion.

That being said, I further submit that zero-day attacks and exploits are an advanced level of attack typically reserved for targeted organizations which have significant levels of security capability mandating these advanced levels of effort. Basically if you've got your fundamentals right, and you're doing good block and tackle security, your users are well educated to be skeptical of links and things sent to them the determined attacker will be forced to turn to exploiting yet unknown and unpatched weaknesses in your software to get through your defenses. The truth is, I have come to believe, that the vast majority of enterprises just don't have their act together enough to merit that level of effort from the attacker.

From what I know, an attacker burning a zero-day exploit is a non-trivial matter. Zero-days, while still fairly plentiful, have a cost associated with them and an attacker will use one of these once he or she has exhausted the typical, and often easy, methods of breaching your security. There are simply too many options further down the chain. You have to look no further than a conversation with David Kennedy of TrustedSec who makes it clear exploits aren't required to break in. All that's required, in still far too many instances, is sending someone in the organization a malicious link, or a malicious file and they'll open the door and show you their closely-guarded intellectual property ... and probably hold the door for you as you walk out with it. Yes, indeed it is that simple to exploit corporate security with brain-boggling results.

So why burn a zero-day? Attackers typically won't unless they've encountered roadblocks in other avenues. Since PowerShell is installed on every new Windows PC, it's the perfect tool to use to execute an attack, legitimately, on a target host. All the user has to do is let you in...and we all know that most users will still click on the lure of a dancing bear or the promise of nude photos of their favorite celebrity.

So while your enterprise security organization may actually encounter some malware with zero-day exploits in them, they likely aren't targeted at your organization. The problem your average enterprise has is poor fundamentals - leaving you open to all manner of exploit and penetration without the use of any more advanced techniques than "asking the user for permission". So why would an attacker burn a precious zero-day against you? They likely wouldn't. Unless, you know, you're a target.

1 comment:

dre said...

My insight here is that "zero day" should change its meaning from zero-day exploit to zero-day RAT.

You are exactly right, though -- it's all about maintaining access and almost nothing about gaining entry.

This should position vendors such as Farsight Security to tackle the C2 problem while the rest of us sharpen our security engineering skills.